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Blindness is a desirable feature in delegated computation. In the classical setting, blind computa-
tions protect the data or even the program run by a server. In the quantum regime, blind computing
may also enable testing computational or other quantum properties of the server system. Here we
propose a scheme for universal blind quantum computation using a quantum simulator capable of
emulating Heisenberg-like Hamiltonians. Our scheme is inspired by the central spin Hamiltonian in
which a single spin controls dynamics of a number of bath spins. We show how, by manipulating this
spin, a client that only accesses the central spin can effectively perform blind computation on the
bath spins. Remarkably, two-way quantum communication mediated by the central spin is sufficient
to ensure security in the scheme. Finally, we provide explicit examples of how our universal blind
quantum computation enables verification of the power of the server from classical to stabilizer to
full BQP computation.
Tremendous progress in the implementation of
quantum simulators [1–8] has led us to an enviable
scenario in which predicting the general dynamics
of a quantum simulator exceeds available classical
computation power. How then are we to measure
the performance of such devices? In benchmarking,
one technique is so-called homomorphic encryption
in which the desired computation is hidden from,
e.g., the server upon which it is implemented and
then decrypted post facto. In the quantum do-
main, such blind computing has been suggested us-
ing the circuit model and the measurement-based
approaches [9, 10]. These protocols rely upon a
high bandwidth quantum communication channel
between the server and the client. Further devel-
opments along these lines have improved security,
blindness, and provided a connection to quantum
interactive proofs [11–18].
Inspired by the central spin Hamiltonian [19–21],
here we build from the ground up a blind computa-
tion scheme using a quantum simulator. While we
require two-way quantum communication, we show
that passing a single qubit back and forth suffices
to ensure security. This approach should be acces-
sible not only in natural central spin implementa-
tion, such as quantum dots [22–27], NV centers [28–
33] and NMR molecules [34–36], but also in simu-
lators that can implement Heisenberg-like interac-
tions such as ion traps [37–40] and circuit QED sys-
tems [2, 41–44].
The paper is structured as follows. We first review
the central spin Hamiltonian where a central spin is
coupled to a number of bath spins. We show how
different states of the central spin effectively leads to
different dynamics of the bath spins. With this ob-
servation, we present a delegated simulation scheme
in which the dynamics of the bath spins are con-
trolled by a single central spin communicated back
and forth between the client and the server. How-
ever, the simulation is blind only if the server is
trusted not to measure the central spin. Such a vul-
nerability is later removed in an improved scheme
with “honeypots” added to detect measurement at-
tempts during the computation. Finally, we show
that our blind simulation scheme is capable of sim-
ulating a universal quantum gate set, and therefore
allows the client to perform universal, blind compu-
tation on the server.
Central spin model– We consider a system in
which the central spin Hamiltonian is either natu-
ral (e.g. in quantum dots, NV centers) or can be
simulated (e.g. using ion traps and circuit QED).
Such a Hamiltonian describes interaction between a
spin- 12 central spin
~S0 with n spin-
1
2 bath spins
~Sj
for j = 1, . . . , n,
Hc =
n∑
j=1
γj ~S0 · ~Sj − h0Sz0 −
n∑
j=1
hjS
z
j , (1)
where ~Sj =
(
Sxj , S
y
j , S
z
j
)
is the spin operator vec-
tor of the jth spin and γj denotes the interaction
strength between ~S0 and ~Sj . The last two terms are
the result of the interaction between the spins and
an external magnetic field. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume the field to be along the z axis. For
our blind computation protocol, we also assume that
h0 and hj , γj for j = 1, . . . , n are tunable parameters
of the system.
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2In the following discussion, we further assume
that the magnetic field on the central spin is much
larger than the interaction between the spins, i.e.
h0  nγ = η with γ = 1n
∑
j |γj | being the average
interaction strength. Without loss of generality and
for simplicity, we further set h0 = 1 in our calcula-
tion. In this η  1 limit, the Hilbert space is well
separated into two subspaces, each corresponds to
an eigenstate of Sz0 of the central spin. Although
there is no interaction term between the bath spins
in Eq. (1), they can still interact with each other via
an interaction mediated by the central spin [45, 46].
Using the Schrieffer-Wolff approximation [47], we
find the Hamiltonians describing such effective inter-
actions among the bath spins in the two subspaces
(Supplemental Material). For example, in the sub-
space that corresponds to the central spin being in
|0〉, i.e. the “up” state, the effective Hamiltonian is
H↑ =− 1
2
∑
j<k
γjγk
(
Sxj S
x
k + S
y
j S
y
k
)
−
n∑
j=1
(
hj − γj
2
− γ
2
j
4
)
Szj +O
(
η3
)
, (2)
where the first sum is over all 1 ≤ j < k ≤ n. Note
that the first sum is also an all-to-all interaction us-
ing which we shall engineer two-qubit gates between
any two spins. Similarly, in the “down” subspace,
i.e. the central spin is in |1〉, the effective Hamilto-
nian between the bath spins is
H↓ =
1
2
∑
j<k
γjγk
(
Sxj S
x
k + S
y
j S
y
k
)
−
n∑
j=1
(
hj +
γj
2
− γ
2
j
4
)
Szj +O
(
η3
)
. (3)
In our discussion below, we shall choose hj = −γ2j /4
in the system. With this choice, the two effective
Hamiltonians are different by only a sign, i.e.
H↑ ≈ −H↓ ≈
∑
j<k
γjγk
2
(
Sxj S
x
k + S
y
j S
y
k
)− n∑
j=1
γj
2
Szj .
(4)
This is a key ingredient in achieving blindness later
in our protocols. Knowing the effective Hamiltoni-
ans, we may approximate the time evolution under
Hc as
e−iHct ≈ |0〉 〈0| ⊗ e−iH↑t + |1〉 〈1| ⊗ e−iH↓t (5)
= e−iZ0⊗H↑t, (6)
Client Server
FIG. 1. A demonstration of our blind simulation and
blind computation schemes. The server Bob can simu-
late dynamics of the central spin Hamiltonian in Eq. (1)
where a central spin (orange) interacts with a number of
bath spins (blue). The bath spins can only interact with
each other via the central spin. The effective dynamics
of the bath spins is therefore encrypted in the state of
the central spin, which is communicated back and forth
between the server and the client.
with |α〉 〈α| (α = 0, 1) being the projection opera-
tor onto the state |α〉 of the central spin and Z0 is
the Pauli-Z acting on the central spin. Our proto-
col leverages the emergence of a three-spin interac-
tion that arises naturally in the central spin settings.
This is in contrast to many quantum gadgets sim-
ulation approaches [48, 49], where 3-local terms re-
quire substantial additional resources for implemen-
tations. This interaction allows the central spin to
control the dynamics of the bath spins. We now
show how such a feature allows Alice and Bob to
perform blind quantum simulation and, in particu-
lar, universal blind quantum computation.
Blind quantum simulation– The three-body inter-
action in Eq. (6) allows a client (Alice) to perform
quantum simulation on a server (Bob) such that de-
tails of the simulation are hidden from Bob. Here
we present a protocol for simulating dynamics of n
bath spins on the server using a single spin com-
municated back and forth with the client. In our
scenario, Alice has a series of m Hamiltonians H
(k)
↑
(k = 1, . . . ,m), each of which is of the form (4) and
is characterized by n real parameters, namely the
γ
(k)
j for j = 1, . . . , n. Note that for each k, these pa-
rameters also characterize a corresponding central
spin Hamiltonian H
(k)
c as in Eq. (1). In addition to
the Hamiltonians, Alice also chooses a set of m con-
stants {t1, . . . , tm} and a binary string α of length
m, i.e. α ∈ {0, 1}m. The former is to play the role
of desired evolution times under the Hamiltonians
of the same index and the latter is a secret key that
encrypts the simulation. The blind simulation pro-
tocol consists of m iterations. In the kth iteration,
3Protocol 1: Blind quantum simulation
Input: the n bath spins in a state
∣∣ψ(0)〉.
1 for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
2 Alice sends Bob classical parameters tk and
γ
(k)
j for all j = 1, . . . , n.
3 Alice sets the central spin to the state |αk〉
and sends to Bob.
4 Bob simulates evolution of the n + 1 spins
under H
(k)
c for time tk.
5 Bob sends the central spin back to Alice.
6 end
7 return the n bath spins in the final state∣∣ψ(m)〉
Alice will communicate a central spin to Bob along
with the classical parameters γ
(k)
j . Bob then sim-
ulates evolution of the n + 1 spins under the H
(k)
c
specified by γ
(k)
j for a time tk. Although Bob knows
the evolution of the whole system, the effective time
evolution of the bath spins under H
(k)
↑ is either for-
ward or backward in time and is encoded by the
secret key αk known only to Alice. Such a protocol
for blind quantum simulation can be summarized in
Protocol 1.
Let us examine the final state of the n bath spins
at the end of this protocol. Denote by
∣∣ψ(k)〉 the
state of the bath spins after the kth iteration. By
the end of line 3 in the kth iteration, Bob has in
his possession n+ 1 spins, including the central spin
sent by Alice, in the state |αk〉⊗
∣∣ψ(k−1)〉. Bob then
simulates the evolution under H
(k)
c for the time tk
and brings the n+ 1 spins to
exp
(
−iH(k)c tk
)
|αk〉 ⊗
∣∣∣ψ(k−1)〉
≈ |αk〉 ⊗ exp
(
−i(−1)αkH(k)↑ tk
) ∣∣∣ψ(0)〉 , (7)
where we have applied Eq. (6) to approximate the
time evolution of the n+1 spins by an effective time
evolution of the bath spins only. By induction from
k = 1 to k = m, the final state of the n spins at the
end of the protocol is∣∣∣ψ(m)〉 = m∏
k=1
exp
(
−i(−1)αkH(k)↑ tk
) ∣∣∣ψ(0)〉
≡ Um
∣∣∣ψ(0)〉 . (8)
Here the information about the effective unitary Um
is partially encrypted by the key α known only to
Desired circuit
Encrypted circuit
FIG. 2. The security of Protocol 2 and Protocol 3
is guaranteed by embedding the desired circuit (blue
blocks) into a much longer circuit. The longer circuit
consists of mostly honeypots (orange blocks) that do
not contribute to the overall computation. Instead, they
serve to detect measurement attempts from the server.
The probability for the server to measure without being
detected decays exponentially with the number of hon-
eypots.
Alice.
For a generic set of H
(k)
c and tk, there are 2
m
possibilities of Um only one of which is actually im-
plemented on the bath spins. Therefore with a long
enough key α, Alice can be confident that Bob has
almost no information about the unitary performed.
Note, however, that this simple protocol does not
protect Alice’s secret from a malicious Bob who tries
to determine the key α by measuring the central spin
every time Alice sends it over.
Indeed, if the protocol is followed, Bob knows the
central spin can only be in one of the two orthogo-
nal states and hence can be deterministically identi-
fied by an appropriate projective measurement. Al-
though Alice may not have the power to stop Bob
from measuring, she can set up honeypots in the
middle of the simulation to trap and abort the sim-
ulation as soon as such a malicious attempt is de-
tected. Using the same idea as in the BB84 quan-
tum key distribution scheme [50], the set of avail-
able states of the central spin can be extended to
{|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} where |±〉 = |0〉 ± |1〉 up to a
normalization constant. Since the four states form a
nonorthogonal set, it is impossible for Bob to deter-
mine with certainty which of the states is prepared
by Alice. In particular, attempts to measure the cen-
tral spin will collapse its state and therefore can be
detected by Alice when the central spin is returned
to her at the end of each iteration. We present below
Protocol 2 with such honeypots.
In addition to the key α ∈ {0, 1,±1}m, Protocol 2
requires Alice to choose another key β ∈ {0, 1,±}m
of the same length m, with one restriction that
βk = ± if αk = ∓ for all k. With this restriction, it is
straightforward to verify that whenever αk = ±, the
4Protocol 2: Secured blind simulation
Input: the n bath spins in a state
∣∣ψ(0)〉.
1 for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} do
2 Alice sends Bob the classical parameters tk
and γ
(k)
j .
3 Alice sets the central spin to |αk〉 and sends
to Bob.
4 Bob simulates evolution of the n + 1 spins
under H
(k)
c for time
tk
2 .
5 Bob returns the central spin back to Alice.
6 Alice applies either a pi pulse, a pi/2 pulse
or identity to rotate the central spin to |βk〉
and sends to Bob.
7 Bob simulates evolution of the n + 1 spins
under H
(k)
c for time
tk
2 .
8 Bob sends the central spin back to Alice.
9 Alice aborts if the returned central spin is
not |βk〉.
10 end
11 return the bath spins in the final state
∣∣ψ(m)〉.
net unitary applied on the bath spins in the kth iter-
ation is equivalent to identity. Such iterations there-
fore only play the role of flagging malicious measure-
ment attempts and do not contribute to the overall
simulation. Note that when β = α ∈ {0, 1}m, Pro-
tocol 2 reduces to Protocol 1.
Universal blind computation– So far we have
shown that Alice can request a general simulation
Um given by Eq. (8) on n bath spins without re-
vealing her data. But how general is Um? In other
words, what type of quantum computation Alice can
achieve by simulating Um? We now show that by
choosing the right parameters γ
(k)
j , tk in each itera-
tion, Alice can simulate any gate in a universal gate
set and therefore is able to perform a blind simu-
lation of an arbitrary quantum circuit. Indeed, by
turning off γj for all except j = 1, the time evolution
unitary is a local rotation of the first spin about the
z axis,
e−iαZ1t = e−i
~γ
2 γ1t
(
1 0
0 ei~γ1t
)
, (9)
where Z1 is the Pauli-Z matrix on the first qubit.
Using this Hamiltonian, we can obtain phase-shift
gates such as the T gate by choosing the right evo-
lution time t. Similarly, by changing the magnetic
field in Eq. (1) to the x axis, Alice can simulate the
Hadamard gate H. To form a universal gate set, we
still need a two-qubit gate such as the following UXY
gate [51]:
UXY ≡

1 0 0 0
0 1√
2
i√
2
0
0 i√
2
1√
2
0
0 0 0 1
 . (10)
To engineer a UXY gate, for example, between the
first and the second qubits, we turn all γj off except
for γ1 = γ2 = γ. The effective time evolution of the
bath spins is
exp
{
−i
(
γ2
8
(X1X2 + Y1Y2) +
γ
2
(Z1 + Z2)
)
t
}
,
(11)
where X,Y are respective Pauli gates. With γ = 72c
for some large integer c and t = 7piγ2 , the above
unitary reduces to the UXY gate. Since the UXY
gate and single-qubit gates form a universal gate
set [51], Alice can effectively perform universal quan-
tum computation on the bath spins. In the following
discussion, we refer to this universal gate set as U .
Protocol 2 can be further adapted to this situa-
tion to guarantee the security of the computation
by using honeypots to detect measurement attacks.
A desired circuit Um0 of length m0 on n qubits can
be embedded into a much larger circuit Um with
m m0 that consists mostly of honeypots (Fig. 2).
These honeypots perform trivial operations on the
qubits and serve only as detectors of malicious be-
haviors. Mean while in each non-honeypot itera-
tion of the protocol, i.e. αk ∈ {0, 1}, Alice can
choose a Hamiltonian H
(k)
↑ and a time tk such that
Gk = exp
{
−iH(k)↑ tk
}
is a gate in the universal gate
set U . Note that such a gate (or its inverse) is only
implemented on the bath spins at the end of the
iteration if βk ⊕ αk = 0. On the other hand, if
βk ⊕ αk = 1, the two evolutions in the kth iteration
cancel each other out and therefore only a trivial
gate is implemented. Denote by ω(αk, βk) a func-
tion of the characters αk, βk such that ω(αk, βk) = 1
if αk ⊕ βk = 0 and ω(αk, βk) = 0 otherwise. The
gate sequence generated by the protocol can then
be summarized by the following equation:
Um =
m∏
k=1
G
ω(αk,βk)
k . (12)
Therefore the keys α, β effectively encrypt the circuit
Alice implements and make the quantum computa-
tion blind. Our protocol for universal blind quantum
5computation is be summarized in Protocol 3 below.
Protocol 3: Universal blind computation
1 Alice has a circuit Um0 of length m0 to be per-
formed on n qubits.
2 Alice embeds Um0 into a much larger circuit Um
by choosing two keys α, β ∈ {0, 1,±}m, each of
length m m0 such that Um in Eq. (12) reduces
to Um0 .
3 Alice and Bob perform Protocol 2 to implement
Um on |ψ〉.
Quantum verification– Blindness allows the client
Alice to not only hide the computation from the
server Bob but also to verify if Bob performs the cor-
rect computation. Indeed, Alice can verify Bob by
simply requesting quantum circuits that have out-
comes that can be classically verified. By the defini-
tion of blind computation used in this work, Bob has
no information about what circuits are being imple-
mented, and the only way he can return the correct
output to Alice is to perform the exact simulation
sequence as instructed. For example, Alice can ask
Bob to initialize the n bath spins in a product state
such that some of the spins are “up” and some are
“down”, and use Protocol 3 to simulate a sequence of
SWAP gates between the bath spins known only to
Alice. The final state is a permutation of the initial
state and is known only to Alice. Bob has to find
the final state and the only way he can pass with
certainty is to correctly perform the computation.
Since both the initial state and the final state are
fully separable, the permutation circuit is essentially
classical. Stabilizer circuits [52, 53], on the other
hand, can perform nontrivial quantum operations,
such as quantum teleportation [54] and preparation
of highly entangled states. They consist of only Clif-
ford gates and can be simulated efficiently on a clas-
sical computer [55]. Therefore by requesting simula-
tion of an arbitrary stabilizer circuits, Alice can also
efficiently verify quantumness of the server.
Alice can also take a step further to verify even
the quantum computing power of the server by re-
questing a quantum circuit that is known to solve
a problem faster than classical algorithms. For
example, in the Simon’s problem [56], a function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is promised to satisfy that
f(x) = f(y) if and only if x = y or x ⊕ y = s for
all x, y ∈ {0, 1}n and a fixed string s ∈ {0, 1}n. To
find s, classical algorithms require at least Ω(2n/2)
queries to the function f while the quantum Simon’s
algorithm can solve the problem using only O (n)
queries. Using Protocol 3, Alice can simulate a quan-
tum circuit corresponding to a secret string s. She
then asks Bob to measure the output and announce
the measured string. If Bob is able to answer cor-
rectly what s is for large enough n, Alice can be
confident that the server Bob has access to at least
a BQP machine.
Outlook– Here we have shown how to implement
an arbitrary circuit controlled by a single spin. This
enables us to define several blind computing proto-
cols that can be a powerful test of computing power
in quantum simulators. However, we have not yet
developed natural observables whose, e.g., distribu-
tion function is distinctly different given classical
versus quantum computational power. We consider
this an intriguing direction for future research.
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Schrieffer-Wolff approximation– In this section,
we show how the Schrieffer-Wolff transformation [47]
reduces the (n + 1)-spin Hamiltonian Hc in Eq. (1)
to the effective Hamiltonians in Eq.(2) and Eq. (3).
We first divide the Hamiltonian Hc into three parts,
namely
H0 = −h0Sz0 , (13)
Hd = −hb
n∑
j=1
Szj +
n∑
j=1
γjS
z
0S
z
j , (14)
Hod =
n∑
j=1
γj
(
Sx0S
x
j + S
y
0S
y
j
)
(15)
=
1
2
n∑
j=1
γj
(
S+0 S
−
j + S
−
0 S
+
j
)
, (16)
where S± = Sx±iSy. Since h0  nγ ≡ η with γ be-
ing the average amplitude of the γj , we treat H0 as
the unperturbed Hamiltonian and Hd + Hod as the
perturbation in our approximation. The eigenspace
of H0 is well separated into two subspaces corre-
sponding to the two eigenvalues ±h0 ~2 . Note that
the Hamiltonian Hd is diagonal in this block repre-
sentation of the Hilbert space while the Hamiltonian
Hod is off-diagonal and hence induces interaction be-
tween the two subspaces. It is this off-diagonal part
of the Hamiltonian that gives rise to the effective in-
teraction between the bath spins, despite them being
not directly coupled in the original Hamiltonian Hc.
The idea of Schrieffer-Wolff approximation is to
block diagonalize the Hamiltonian in the basis of H0.
Such a block diagonalization can be achieved using
a unitary U = eT with T being an anti-Hermitian
operator. In Ref. [47], the operator T is expanded
using a Taylor series, i.e. T =
∑∞
k=1 Tkη
k in terms
of the perturbation order η = nγ. In the following
discussion, we shall absorb the order ηk into Tk. The
effective Hamiltonian in the low energy subspace of
H0 is given by [47]
H↑ =H0P0 + P0(Hd +Hod)P0
+
1
2
P0 [T1, Hod]P0 +O
(
η3
)
, (17)
where P0 = |0〉 〈0| is the projector onto the lower
energy subspace of H0. It is straightforward to cal-
culate the first two terms,
H0P0 = −1
2
h0, (18)
P0(Hd +Hod)P0 = P0HdP0 (19)
= −hb
n∑
j=1
Szj +
1
2
n∑
j=1
γjS
z
j . (20)
To calculate the third term, we use the formula given
in Section 3.2 in Ref. [47] to first find the operator
T1,
T1 =
1
2
〈0|S+0 |1〉
E+ − E− |0〉 〈1|
n∑
j=1
γjS
−
j
+
1
2
〈1|S−0 |0〉
E− − E+ |0〉 〈1|
n∑
j=1
γjS
+
j (21)
=− 1
2h
n∑
j=1
γj
(
S+0 S
−
j − S−0 S+j
)
. (22)
where E± = ∓h0/2 are the eigenvalues of H0. Thus
the third term in Eq. (17) is
1
2
P0[T1, Hod]P0 = − 1
8h0
P0
∑
j,k
γjγk
[
S+0 S
−
j − S−0 S+j , S+0 S−k + S−0 S+k
]
P0 (23)
= −
2h0
∑
j<k
γjγk
(
Sxj S
x
k + S
y
j S
y
k
)
+
1
4h
∑
j
γ2jS
z
j −
1
8h
∑
j
γ2j . (24)
Here we have omitted the straightforward simplifi-
cation from the first to the second line. Combining
Eq. (18), Eq. (20) and Eq. (24) we have the effec-
tive Hamiltonian between the bath spins in the low
energy subspace (up to a constant),
H↑ =− 1
2h0
∑
j<k
γjγk
(
Sxj S
x
k + S
y
j S
y
k
)
−
n∑
j=1
(
hj − γj
2
− γ
2
j
4h0
)
Szj +O
(
η3
)
. (25)
8We note that this is the effective Hamiltonian in a
frame rotated by eT . However, in our scenario, eT =
I+O
(
η2
)
is approximately identity. Therefore after
rotating back to the laboratory frame and taking
only the leading orders, the effective Hamiltonian
between the bath spins in the low energy subspace
is still given by Eq. (25).
The effective Hamiltonian in the high energy sub-
space, i.e. the space corresponding to the central
spin being |1〉, can be found using the exact same
steps. However, instead of using the projector P0, we
project onto the high energy subspace Q0 = I− P0.
In the end, we have a system in which the effective
Hamiltonian can be switched between H↑ and H↓ by
controlling the state of the central spin. Such a fea-
ture is captured by an unitary on the whole system
e−iHct ≈ |0〉 〈0| ⊗ e−iH↑t + |1〉 〈1| ⊗ e−iH↓t. (26)
